



**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

Top Secret

CPAS/CIG,

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National Intelligence Daily

***Monday
20 September 1982***

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CPAS NID 82-220JX

20 September 1982

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


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USSR - SOUTH YEMEN: Talks in Moscow Conclude

Soviet and South Yemeni leaders did not allow their reported differences to affect the outward appearance of close cooperation during President al-Hasani's visit to Moscow last week.

The final communique stressed the two countries' continuing friendship. Although neither President Brezhnev nor Premier Tikhonov greeted or saw al-Hasani off at the airport, as is the usual practice, Brezhnev participated fully in the talks.

Comment: Brezhnev's absence from the airport may have been intended as a sign of Moscow's displeasure with al-Hasani after Aden's recent attempts to improve relations with moderate Arab states and the West. The otherwise normal handling of the visit suggests the Soviets did not want to belabor the point but prefer discreet persuasion to preserve the USSR's position in South Yemen.

Al-Hasani, nevertheless, is likely to continue to work cautiously to weaken Soviet influence in South Yemen's internal affairs and increase his room to maneuver.

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SPECIAL ANALYSES

(11) ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israeli Intentions

The massacre of Palestinians has embarrassed the Begin government badly and will cost it substantial political support, although it will probably not affect its hold on power. The massacre does not appear to have harmed the candidacy of Phalange leader Amin Jumayyil, who in fact seems closer to winning the election scheduled for tomorrow.

The government will have difficulty countering Labor Party charges that the incident, following so soon after Bashir Jumayyil's assassination, proves that Prime Minister Begin has no understanding of the complexities of Lebanese politics and has allowed Israel to be dragged into a no-win situation. Labor will also argue that the recent events make it all but impossible for Israel to secure a peace treaty or the withdrawal of the remaining Palestinian and Syrian forces and that Tel Aviv should now pull its forces back to the 25-mile zone.

1-7 Labor's ability to capitalize on the government's embarrassment, however, will be hindered by the party's image as indecisive and faction-ridden. Labor will probably not be able to oust Begin on this issue.

Opponents of Defense Minister Sharon within the cabinet will use the massacre to try and undercut him and perhaps force his removal. While Begin will be reluctant to support moves against Sharon, the incident has clearly dealt a major blow to the Defense Minister's political ambitions. Many Israelis will feel that, as architect of Israel's Lebanon policy, Sharon bears some responsibility for the massacre,

Under pressure from Labor and some of his coalition partners, Begin will be forced to take some action to distance his government from the criticism. He has already called for an inquiry into the incident.

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The Israelis will probably also seek to shift some of the blame onto the Lebanese Army and, indirectly, the US. Chief of Staff Eytan reportedly told journalists that "foreign elements" had prevented Israel from allowing the Lebanese Army to police the camps. [redacted]

But the criticism is not likely to deter Begin from continuing to push for the achievement of his goals. Begin will now feel compelled to demonstrate the wisdom of his policies and justify the high costs of the invasion and will be reluctant to order any more than token pullbacks of Israeli forces. [redacted]

The Lebanese Presidency

Former President Camille Shamun appears to be losing the support of some who had urged him to run and is reportedly wavering in his decision to oppose Amin Jumayyil.

[redacted] there has been a sudden shift of Muslim support away from Shamun. Shia Muslim deputies who had earlier pledged to back him appear to be responding to instructions from the two most prominent Shia leaders, who have thrown their support to Amin.

Many Shias are adamantly opposed to the Palestinians and probably are not moved by events of the last several days. Israeli intimidation of deputies in areas under Israeli control probably also has contributed to this shift. [redacted]

Eight other deputies--seven of them Muslims--who had boycotted last month's election in an effort to block Bashir Jumayyil's presidential ambitions have now come out in support of his brother, Amin. Most significant of these is elder statesman Saib Salam, a leader of the Sunni Muslim community. [redacted]

Salam probably believes he will be able to influence Amin. Moreover, his public statements blaming the forces of southern Christian leader Haddad and ignoring the Phalange role in the massacre probably was designed to make his support for Amin more palatable to Sunni Muslims. [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Next Steps

17 The Israelis apparently believe that the Lebanese Army is not capable of asserting control, and that it will be necessary to rely on Phalange military forces. Negotiations for an Israeli withdrawal from West Beirut will be the first order of business for the new Lebanese Government. Statements by Sharon and other Israeli leaders suggest that they will not leave West Beirut until they are satisfied that all PLO forces are out of the area. [REDACTED]

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If Israel persists in its demands for a peace treaty--still the most important objective for Begin--the emerging domestic political consensus for Amin is likely to shatter. Sunnis and other factions have always opposed signing a treaty, and the massacre of Palestinian civilians has made the issue even more sensitive. Efforts to push ahead with treaty negotiations once again could move Lebanon down the road toward partition. [REDACTED]

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President Sarkis believes that the new president must immediately enter into a special relationship with the US and conclude a treaty or pact placing Lebanon under US protection. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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USSR-INDIA: Moscow's Hopes for Gandhi Trip

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The Soviets hope to use Prime Minister Gandhi's trip to the USSR, which begins today, to get India's support on as many international issues as possible and thereby to impede India's efforts to improve relations with China and the US. They also want to add to Pakistan's sense of encirclement. The measure of their success probably depends less on what they offer the Indians than on the progress, or the lack of it, in resolving problems between India and China and between India and the US.

The Soviets have been trying to get Gandhi to visit Moscow ever since early 1980 when she returned to power. She was ignored when Moscow thought she had no political future, and she was unwilling to visit so soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but insisted it was President Brezhnev's turn to visit New Delhi.

Gandhi continued to stall even after Brezhnev visited India in December 1980, and she refused to go to Moscow for the 10th anniversary of the Friendship Treaty in August 1981. The dates for the current trip were not set until after she had made other foreign trips, resumed the dialogue with China that had been interrupted by the invasion of Vietnam in 1979, and had received an invitation to visit the US.

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Brezhnev will probably brief the Prime Minister extensively on Soviet-US relations, recent developments in Sino-Soviet relations, and Pakistani Foreign Secretary Naik's recently concluded trip to the USSR. He will use the briefings to heighten Indian distrust of Washington, Beijing, and Islamabad. He will probably seek closer Indo-Soviet collaboration against Pakistan and China.

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Prospects

The Soviets may respond to Gandhi's demands on the Afghan issue by making some minor adjustment in their negotiating position during the visit, but their behavior during the Pakistani Foreign Secretary's trip suggests any such concessions will not move the talks significantly forward. Soviet media coverage of Indian internal events this year makes it apparent that Moscow wants to retain the leverage the Indian Communist opposition to Gandhi's domestic policies provides and that it is not prepared to sacrifice Indian Communist Party interests at this time. [REDACTED]

1/ Gandhi will want to maintain India's nonaligned credentials before hosting the Nonaligned Movement Summit early next year, but she probably will accommodate the Soviets on some issues. She reportedly will agree, for example, to help block Prince Sihanouk's attendance at the Summit. [REDACTED]

The Indian Prime Minister probably will also reiterate positions the Soviets can live with on the Afghan and Indian Ocean issues. She will not, however, endorse Soviet proposals for Asian or Persian Gulf collective security and will treat Brezhnev's recent Middle East proposals as but one of several acceptable ideas currently on the table. [REDACTED]

Any new aid agreements that are announced probably will be funded from the \$500 million in Soviet credits previously extended to India but not yet allocated to specific projects. Among the projects still under discussion are an alumina project and an oil refinery. The two sides probably will also announce plans for expansion of trade relations, with the Soviets emphasizing the benefits India receives from its sales of consumer products to the USSR. [REDACTED]

Gandhi will want to preserve good relations with the USSR even if there is some improvement in relations with China and the US. Her decision, nevertheless, to continue the previous Indian Government's efforts to reduce military dependence on the USSR--and her moves to broaden India's foreign policy options--suggests she finally is focusing on the negative implications for India of a long-term Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, on the edge of the subcontinent. [REDACTED]

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Approved For Release 2007/06/01 : CIA-RDP84T00301R000500010062-4

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